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CHINA’S AIRCRAFT CARRIER AMBITIONS
Seeking Truth from Rumors
Ian Storey and You Ji
For more than a decade there have been persistent reports that the People’sRepublic of China (PRC) intends to acquire an aircraft carrier force as part of
its ambition to achieve “blue-water” (high seas) naval capability. Some reports
suggest that China plans to refit one or more aircraft carriers from the former
Soviet Union or other countries. Others claim that China has investigated the
possibility of buying a light aircraft carrier from a European shipbuilder. Other
reports suggest China has already made the decision to build two or three indig-
enous carriers and has even allocated funding for the program. However, none
of these reports has ever been confirmed, and no firm evidence exists that China
really does intend to refurbish, build, or buy an aircraft carrier. Thus the pros-
pect of a Chinese carrier remains subject to a great deal of rumor and
speculation.
However, the issue is an important one, for a number of reasons. Were China
to begin operating aircraft carrier battle groups, the strategic equations in the
Taiwan Strait and South China Sea would be altered. Moreover, the appearance
of Chinese aircraft carriers would inevitably set alarm bells ringing throughout
East Asia, especially in Japan and Southeast Asian capitals. It would also have
implications for U.S. naval policy in the Asia-Pacific region.
This article examines the issue of Chinese aircraft carrier capability from sev-
eral angles. First, it reviews the “development” of China’s aircraft carrier pro-
gram to date and the various media reports that have appeared over the years.
Second, it traces the progress of China’s blue-water ambitions and the debate
within the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) as to the necessity of acquir-
ing such vessels. Third, it assesses China’s ability to initiate a carrier-building
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program, and the financial, technological, and geopolitical problems involved in
such a venture.
CHINA’S AIRCRAFT CARRIER PROGRAM TO DATE
The father of China’s aircraft carrier research and development (R&D) program
was Admiral Liu Huaqing. From 1954 to 1958 Liu studied under the great Soviet
naval strategist Admiral Sergei Gorshkov at the Voroshilov Naval Academy in
Leningrad. Gorshkov was the driving force behind the Soviet navy’s oceangoing
offensive strategy, an ambition that came to fruition during the 1980s.
Gorshkov’s maritime strategy greatly influenced Liu’s ideas on how the People’s
Liberation Army Navy should evolve. Like its Soviet counterpart, the PLAN had
traditionally been subordinate to the army, with a primary role of coastal de-
fense. Liu argued that China’s maritime doctrine should evolve through two
stages. The first should be a “green-water active defense” that would enable the
PLAN to protect China’s territorial waters and enforce its sovereignty claims in
the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. The second phase would be to develop a
blue-water navy capable of projecting power into the western Pacific. Liu was
able to put these ideas into practice during his tenure as commander in chief of
the PLAN (1982–88) and then as vice chairman of the powerful Central Military
Commission (1989–97).
Liu believed that in order to fulfill a blue-water capability, the PLAN had to
obtain aircraft carriers. In 1997, just before his retirement, Liu penned an article
in Zhongguo Haiyang Bao (China’s Maritime Paper) in which he argued it was
“extremely necessary” for China to possess aircraft carriers. According to Liu,
aircraft carriers were needed to protect China’s sovereignty and maritime re-
sources, especially with regard to Taiwan and the South China Sea; guard China’s
sea lanes of communications as the country industrialized and increasingly be-
came a major trading power; enable China to keep up with regional powers such
as India and Japan; and give the PLAN a decisive edge in future naval warfare.1
On becoming commander in chief of the Chinese navy in 1982, Liu initiated
at the navy’s Shanghai Research Institute a feasibility study on the design and
construction of an aircraft carrier. Models were constructed and tested in the in-
stitute’s six-hundred-meter (656-yard) pool and at Tai Lake in Jiangsu Prov-
ince.2 In 1985 Liu ordered the establishment at the Guangzhou Naval Academy
of a training course for aircraft carrier commanders.3 (Following the American
tradition, aircraft carrier commanding officers would be selected from among
pilots rather than captains of surface warships.) The importance of the course
was underlined by the academy’s president, Admiral Yao:
Since the Second World War, aircraft carriers as the symbols of a country’s important
deterrent power have been accorded more attention. For some historical reasons,
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China has not yet built aircraft carriers. But the Academy must look forward and
train experts needed for the carriers. As the building process is long we simply cannot
afford to dig wells after becoming thirsty.4
In 1992, students in the course began active training on board China’s most ad-
vanced guided-missile destroyers.5
Carrier design and pilot training received a major boost in 1985 when a Chi-
nese ship breaker purchased the fifteen-thousand-ton Majestic-class aircraft
carrier HMAS Melbourne from Australia. At that time the Australian govern-
ment did not oppose the sale, because China was seen as an important strategic
counterweight to perceived Soviet expansionism in Asia. The purchase helped
the PLAN’s R&D program in two ways. First, as the carrier was being dismantled
for scrap, Chinese naval architects and engineers were able to see at first hand
how it had been designed and built; using this information naval architects were
able to prepare drawings for a light carrier. Second, the flight deck of the Mel-
bourne was kept intact and used for pilot training in carrier takeoffs and land-
ings (though a static flight deck would, of course, have been of limited utility,
since it could not replicate the pitch and roll of an aircraft carrier at sea). China’s
carrier R&D program remained top secret. In 1987 Colonel General Xu Xing
denied that China wanted to acquire an aircraft carrier capability, citing the
country’s “defensive” military doctrine.6
During much of the 1980s the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) focused on the
land threat posed by the USSR in the Soviet Far East and did not see an aircraft
carrier as a strategic priority. However, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 allowed
China to turn its attention to strategic priorities in the south and southeast—
namely, the South China Sea dispute and Taiwan. Both of these areas of potential
conflict required increased naval power. As a result, China’s aircraft carrier R&D
program was accelerated.
In the first half of the 1990s reports appeared and persisted that China was in-
terested in purchasing an aircraft carrier from another country as a stopgap
measure while it built its own. In 1992 the Chinese government reportedly ap-
proached the Ukrainian government with a view to buying the unfinished Soviet
Kuznetsov-class carrier Varyag. However, nothing came of these talks; the Ukrai-
nian government in fact denied that any discussions had taken place.7 In Decem-
ber 1992 Russian president Boris Yeltsin visited Beijing, where Chinese officials
reportedly expressed to him an interest in buying one of the Russian navy’s
forty-thousand-ton Kiev-class carriers.8 Although nothing came of these talks
either, Chinese companies were later able, as will be discussed later, to purchase
two Kiev-class carriers (the Kiev and Minsk) and the still-incomplete Varyag.
S T O R E Y & Y O U 7 9
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In 1995–96 two European countries approached China with aircraft carrier
technology. In February 1995 it was reported that the Spanish shipbuilder
Empresa Nacional Bazan had offered to build China a low-cost, lightweight
conventional-takeoff-and-landing (CTOL) carrier. Bazan placed before China
two designs: the twenty-three-thousand-ton SAC-200 (overall length 728 feet,
or 221.8 meters); and the twenty-five-thousand-ton SAC-220 (overall length
787 feet, or 240 meters).9 The cost of the vessels
would be $350–400 million. The SAC-220
would accommodate up to twenty-one CTOL
fighters, such as the MiG-29K. According to
Bazan, the first carrier could be delivered within
five years, with the second three and a half years
later. At the time, Bazan was constructing the
11,500-ton carrier Chakri Naruebet for the
Royal Thai Navy and was eager to secure further
orders in Asia. China expressed an interest in the
proposal, and initial talks between the Chinese
and Bazan were held in January 1996. However,
according to a representative of Bazan who
spoke with the authors, the Chinese side seemed
more interested in obtaining the blueprints of
the carrier than in ordering the actual vessel.10
At the end of 1995 it was reported that France
had offered to give China, gratis, the 32,700-ton
carrier Clemenceau.11 In return it was expected
that French companies would be awarded lucra-
tive contacts to upgrade the vessel’s radar and
communication systems. Again, nothing came
of the proposal. However, even if the Spanish or French proposals had pro-
gressed farther, delivering an aircraft carrier to China would have been politi-
cally difficult, especially with the European Union’s 1989 post–Tiananmen
Square arms embargo on Beijing still in place.
Beginning in 1997, a series of newspaper articles suggested that China had
decided to build its own fleet of aircraft carriers rather than either upgrading
secondhand vessels from abroad or buying new ones. In November 1997 the Far
Eastern Economic Review reported that the Chinese government had shelved
plans to build fixed-wing carriers in favor of smaller helicopter carriers.12 In
1999 Singapore’s Straits Times reported that the Chinese Communist Party Cen-
tral Committee and the State Council had earmarked 250 million yuan for the
design and construction of two aircraft carriers, to be completed by 2009.13 In
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2000 the respected Hong Kong Chinese-language newspaper Ming Pao reported
that construction of China’s first carrier would begin later that year and would
be completed by 2003.14 According to Ming Pao the Chinese carrier would dis-
place forty-eight thousand tons and carry twenty-four fighters, probably
Su-27Ks (Su-33s) from Russia. The cost of each vessel would be 4.8 billion yuan
($580 million).
However, to date there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that any aircraft
carriers are under construction in the PRC.
EX-SOVIET AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND CHINA’S R&D PROGRAM
As mentioned earlier, during the early 1990s China repeatedly sought to buy air-
craft carriers from the former Soviet Union. By 2000 it had managed to acquire
three: Minsk, Kiev, and Varyag. How these vessels were acquired and the pur-
poses to which they have been put make interesting reading.
In 1975 the USSR commissioned the Kiev, the first of a new class of forty-
thousand-ton carriers designed to provide organic fighter cover for the Soviet
navy. Between 1978 and 1984 three more Kiev-class carriers were commissioned:
Minsk (1978), Novorossiysk (1982), and Admiral Gorshkov (1984). Kiev-class
carriers (referred to by the Russians as “heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers”) were
conventionally powered and capable of carrying twelve Yak-38 Forger vertical/
short-takeoff-and-landing (VSTOL) fighters and twenty helicopters. Following
the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the subsequent emasculation of the Rus-
sian navy, all four carriers were decommissioned.
In 1995 the Minsk and Novorossiysk were sold to South Korea for scrapping.
However, in June 1998 the Minsk was purchased for five million dollars by a Chi-
nese firm, the Minsk Aircraft Carrier Industry Company.15 Before the sale went
through, however, the South Korean firm stripped the warship of its armaments,
engines, and communication systems and exacted a guarantee that the new ves-
sel would not be used for military purposes.16 The Minsk was towed to
Guangdong Province, where a four-million-dollar conversion transformed the
carrier into a floating museum. The vessel was moved to Shenzhen in September
2000 to form the centerpiece of the “Minsk World” theme park. For an entrance
fee of eight dollars, visitors can now board the former flagship of the Soviet Pa-
cific Fleet and see MiG fighters on the flight deck, models of antiship missiles
and other weapons systems, and exhibitions on the history of the Russian navy
and the Soviet space program. Visitors can also watch displays of Russian danc-
ing in the hangar, eat at a Russian-themed restaurant, and ride on a tank on
parkland in front of the vessel. According to the pro-Beijing Hong Kong news-
paper Wen Wei Po, Minsk World is aimed at “popularising science as well as
S T O R E Y & Y O U 8 1
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national defense education.”17 Minsk World has proved a hit with both locals
and tourists alike.
In May 2000 the Kiev was purchased by the Tianma Shipbreaking Company
in Tianjin for $8.4 million.18 The contract with the Russian Defense Ministry
stipulated that the vessel had to be scrapped. However, local authorities in
Tianjin had other ideas for the Kiev. In July 2000 the Tianjin Municipal Standing
Committee established a project investment corporation with the aim of turn-
ing the aircraft carrier into a tourist attraction. In November 2000 the original
contract with Moscow was renegotiated to allow the Kiev to be used for tourism
purposes. According to the developer, the Kiev will form part of the Beiyang Rec-
reation Harbor project, which will include “military recreation activities, muse-
ums, exhibitions, fun parks, recreational grounds, [and] education sites.”19
Planned amenities on the Kiev include a conference center, TV studio, night-
clubs, restaurants, and swimming pool.
The most intriguing purchase to date has been that of the Varyag. The second
of the 67,500-ton Kuznetsov class, the Varyag was laid down in 1985 at the
Nikolayev shipyards in the Ukraine, then part of the USSR. Kuznetsov-class car-
riers are conventionally powered but unlike the Kiev class are capable of accom-
modating fixed-wing aircraft,
such as Su-27Ks and MiG-
29Ks. This class of carrier does
not utilize a steam catapult for
launching fighters but is
equipped instead with a ski
jump at the bow to allow short
takeoffs. Work on the Varyag
was abandoned at the begin-
ning of 1992 following the
breakup of the Soviet Union.
The USSR’s successor state,
Russia, could not afford to pay
Ukraine to complete construc-
tion. The vessel was 70 percent complete but was without engines, rudders, or
armament. As mentioned earlier, the Chinese government expressed an interest
in buying the Varyag in 1992, but the sale did not go through at that time.
In March 1998 the Varyag was bought by the Chong Lot Tourist and Amuse-
ment Agency for twenty million dollars.20 Chong Lot was based in the then
Portuguese colony of Macau, although the company had no offices there;21
Chong Lot was in fact a subsidiary of a Hong Kong company, Chin Luck Hold-
ings. In November 1998 Chong Lot unveiled plans to turn the Varyag into a
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floating casino and entertainment complex anchored in Macau harbor.22 Two
aspects of this plan were unusual. First, the Macanese authorities did not (and
have yet to) receive an application to operate a casino on an aircraft carrier in the
enclave. Second, the waters around Macau are too shallow to accommodate such
a large vessel.23
When news of the sale was announced, the Russian media claimed that
Chong Lot and Chin Luck were acting on behalf of the Chinese government. The
Chinese embassy in Moscow was quick to dismiss these reports.24 However, in-
vestigations by the Hong Kong media revealed that the two companies involved
in the purchase of the Varyag had close connections with the PRC. Two of Chong
Lot’s directors were former PLAN officers.25 In August 1999, Hong Kong–based
Goldspot Investments became a majority shareholder in Chong Lot. One of the
directors of Goldspot has an address inside a military compound in Beijing. The
majority shareholder of Goldspot is China Securities International Ltd., which in
turn is a subsidiary of China Securities, a large, state-owned brokerage house.26
The plan to tow the Varyag to Macau was held up for fifteen months because the
Turkish authorities refused to allow the vessel to pass through the Bosporus Strait,
alleging a danger to shipping.27 In September 2001 Turkey finally gave permission
for the passage. After an eventful journey through the Mediterranean and
around the Cape of Good Hope, the Varyag arrived in March 2002 at the north-
eastern Chinese port of Dalian.28 The owners continue to assert that the vessel
will be turned into a casino.
The purchase of these carriers raises two important questions. First, is it mere
coincidence that three of the former Soviet navy’s aircraft carriers have ended up
in the PRC? Second, if it is not coincidence, how valuable are these vessels to
China’s research and development program?
It stretches belief that the acquisition of three ex-Soviet carriers by Chinese
companies is mere happenstance. Chinese authorities actively tried to purchase
directly one or more Kiev-class carriers and the Varyag in 1992–93 but failed.
Beijing has now been able to accomplish this goal through China-based compa-
nies. In the case of the Varyag, as noted, the companies involved had links to the
central authorities and the Chinese military. For some reason Beijing was partic-
ularly keen to acquire the Varyag. Its price, twenty million dollars, was about
three times its scrap value. Moreover, it was the direct intervention of Chinese
deputy foreign minister, Yang Wenchang, who visited Ankara in September
2001, that finally won clearance to tow the ship through the Bosporus. Yang re-
portedly offered a $360 million economic aid and tourism package to induce the
Turkish government to let the Varyag go.29
If the Chinese government was behind the purchases, to what purpose could
it put these vessels? Many analysts have contended that Chinese naval architects
S T O R E Y & Y O U 8 3
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and engineers could learn a great deal about the design and construction of air-
craft carriers by inspecting the vessels. Presumably PLAN experts have already
inspected the three carriers. In May 2002 the Hong Kong media reported that se-
curity around the Kiev in Tianjin was very tight, leading to speculation that na-
val architects and engineers were examining the vessel.30 However, the value of
these inspections has probably been overstated. The technology employed was a
generation behind that of Western navies; China would simply be learning ob-
solete technology. Should the Chinese employ this technology in an indigenous
carrier, it would be obsolete when begun, let alone after the time it would take to
construct and commission it.
CHINA’S MARITIME DOCTRINE AND THE ROLE OF
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
Since the early 1980s, and especially during the 1990s, there was much talk of
China’s blue-water ambitions. Military analysts generally believed that by the
year 2000 or shortly thereafter, the PLAN would have achieved green-water (i.e.,
coastal zone) status and would be capable of limited power projection into the
western Pacific. By 2010 the transition to a blue-water navy would be complete.
As of 2003, however, although the Chinese navy has increased its basic war readi-
ness over the past decade, its overall progress is stagnant. It cannot even exercise
sea control in its own coastal waters.
China’s blue-water ambitions have remained unfulfilled for three reasons.
First, despite impressive economic growth and industrialization since 1978, the
PRC still lacks the financial resources and technological know-how to effect
rapid and effective naval modernization. Second, as will be examined later, the
Taiwan issue has forced the Chinese leadership to focus on home waters. Third,
Soviet influence in terms of operational doctrine, campaign theory, and combat
tactics persists, hindering the PLAN’s transition to blue-water capability.31
In combat terms, the PLAN is restricted to offshore-water defense, mostly at
the campaign level. In other words, although the Chinese naval strategy envis-
ages, on paper, a global reach in the future, for the present it emphasizes the stra-
tegic or tactical deployment of naval power. This emphasis limits strategic
objectives, weapons acquisition, and battle planning. More importantly, the
PLAN’s maritime strategy is reflected in the combat models that actually guide
the navy’s modernization.
According to China’s maritime doctrine, there are two combat models: the
first is the independent employment of naval power, and the second is that of
joint operations with other services, particularly the army.32 According to the
first model, the navy’s role is to project power into areas far from home waters,
most likely in the form of strategic independent campaigns against the enemy’s
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fleets or land targets. Under the second model, the PLAN’s primary mission is
defensive—to engage enemy ships in coastal waters—but the navy also has an
offensive role, to assist the army and air force in amphibious operations. At
present, the PLAN is limited in scope to missions of the second model, and has
accordingly developed a light fleet. Ultimately, though, the goal is to fulfill the
first model.
The projection of naval power far from coastal waters (i.e., the first model) is
in fact a mission the PLAN already faces, though without the resources to ac-
complish it.33 The most likely scenario would be armed conflict in the South
China Sea, where the Chinese navy’s mission would be to occupy disputed is-
lands, ejecting the forces of other disputants. Conflict in the Taiwan Strait is a
unique case that cuts across the two models. Any action in the strait would be
geographically close to home. However, the conflict zone could expand into
deep oceans if the United States were to become involved militarily (as the ma-
jority of Chinese security analysts fully expect that it would).34 In this case, the
PLAN would have to engage enemy fleets relatively independently and in distant
waters while it was assisting the army in amphibious landings on the island.
Sea control and sea denial are two important concepts that sustain the
PLAN’s combat models. Admiral Liu set attaining sea control as the service’s
most important priority soon after he became commander in chief. The PLAN
proposes to exercise sea control
within an inner line of defense
that comprises China’s three off-
shore narrows: the Bohai Sea
Strait, the Taiwan Strait, and the
Qiongzhou Strait. Of these the Bohai is the most important, as it protects Beijing
and northern China. The Taiwan Strait is also vital, because it allows the PLAN
access to the western Pacific. Aside from these three straits, the South China Sea
is an area of major concern for the navy.
In exercising sea control, the PLAN would launch defensive campaigns
against enemy fleets in waters adjacent to major coastal cities, such as Shanghai,
Hong Kong, and Fuzhou. The Chinese navy would also try to obtain, by means
of an offensive campaign—such as an amphibious landing on islands occupied
by Taiwan, such as Jinmen—control of the sea around the invasion area and to
protect the People’s Liberation Army from the air and sea. As far as the PLAN is
concerned, sea control is to be achieved not across a large horizontal geographic
area but in a few vertically distributed lanes. It need not be comprehensive; par-
tial control for a limited time would be sufficient.
In contrast, the outer layer of China’s maritime defense is covered by the
sea-denial concept. According to senior Chinese naval analysts, the traditional
S T O R E Y & Y O U 8 5
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U.S. ocean frontiers of containment against China involve two “island chains.”
The first stretches from Japan to the Liuqi Islands, then to Taiwan and the Phil-
ippines. The second island chain stretches from Japan’s Ogasawara-gunto Is-
lands to the Marianas. The PLAN’s second layer of defense and its sea-denial
capabilities are designed primarily to break a blockade of the first island chain.35
How is the PLAN’s aircraft carrier program linked to these two combat mod-
els? Actually the linkage is not very clear, and this is one of the reasons why the
project has been shelved. That said, the program has only been delayed, not can-
celed altogether. Research and development continues, demonstrating that air-
craft carriers are not considered irrelevant to China’s national defense and the
Chinese navy’s long-term modernization goals.
The continued relevance of an aircraft carrier capability for China lies in the
fact that sea control can be achieved only through air superiority. This reality
was the origin of China’s aircraft carrier ambitions. In the 1980s the PLAN per-
ceived a need to acquire aircraft carriers for possible action in the South China
Sea. If China was to dominate
the area, it needed air superi-
ority. Given the distances in-
volved from the Chinese
mainland (950 miles, or 1,500
kilometers) and the very short
reach of People’s Liberation
Army Air Force fighters, the
navy considered that air control
could be won only by carrier-
based aircraft. Admiral Liu
was not convinced that aerial
in-flight refueling was the
answer to the range limitations
of land-based air. In March 1990 Liu visited the air force base where in-flight refuel-
ing technology was being developed; he remained unconvinced that the tanker
aircraft could be protected except by fighters from aircraft carriers.36
As mentioned earlier, with the disappearance of the Soviet threat in 1991, the
Chinese military focused its attention on the South China Sea dispute and the
Taiwan problem. During the first half of the decade, priority was given to the
South China Sea dispute, which centered around the Spratly Islands, a group of
about two hundred small reefs and atolls. Sovereignty of the Spratlys is con-
tested by six parties; China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim ownership of all the is-
lands in the archipelago, and the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei claim certain
parts of the group. The area includes valuable fishing grounds and is believed to
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be rich in oil and gas deposits; additionally, the islands occupy an important
strategic position straddling vital sea lanes that link the Indian and Pacific
Oceans and carry much of the world’s trade. China bases its claims on grounds
of discovery and occupation stretching back thousands of years. In the early
1990s China began pursuing a more assertive policy in the area. In 1992 the Chi-
nese National People’s Congress passed the Territorial Law of the Sea, by which it
claimed sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea; in May 1992 Beijing
awarded the U.S. oil company Crestone a contract to search for oil in waters dis-
puted by Vietnam; and in July 1992 PLA forces occupied Vietnamese-claimed
Da Lac Reef. Most alarming of all, Chinese-built structures were discovered in
February 1995 on Mischief Reef, claimed by the Philippines.37 These structures
were upgraded into a permanent military fortress in November 1998.38 China’s
policy in the South China Sea has been one of “creeping assertiveness”—estab-
lishing an ever greater physical presence, but gradually and without military
confrontation.
Later in the 1990s China’s focus shifted to the Taiwan Strait, because of a dete-
rioration in cross-strait relations. During the decade Taiwan had democratized,
a strong Taiwanese identity had emerged, and the leadership in Taipei had begun
to pursue more self-confident and independent-minded policies.39 Manifesta-
tions of this newfound self-confidence included President Lee Teng-hui’s trip to
the United States in June 1995, the December 1995 legislative elections, and the
March 1996 presidential poll, the first ever held on the island. China was increas-
ingly exasperated by these developments and lashed out at what it saw as moves
toward Taiwanese independence. Cross-strait relations reached crisis point
between July 1995 and March 1996, when Beijing conducted a series of mili-
tary maneuvers and live missile tests near Taiwan in an effort to intimidate its
voters and to send Taipei an unmistakable and definite signal that it was seri-
ous about reunification at any cost. When President Lee announced his “two
states theory” in July 1999, Beijing mobilized the armed forces and con-
ducted amphibious landing exercises, again as a warning to Taiwan. The Tai-
wanese electorate was not intimidated and in March 2000 elected as president the
pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party candidate, Chen Shui-bian,
thus propelling cross-strait relations into a new and uncertain realm. The Chi-
nese government has since repeatedly warned Taiwan that it does not rule out
the use of force to achieve reunification.
As China’s primary security concern has shifted to the Taiwan theater, the ac-
quisition of aircraft carriers seems to have lost whatever urgency it had. Should
conflict erupt in the Taiwan Strait, operations are likely to be conducted within
three hundred kilometers (190 miles) of the mainland. The PLA is confident
that as modernization of the air force continues, land-based aviation can control
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the air over at least selected maritime areas at that range. In addition, China is
increasingly relying on its growing arsenal of medium and intermediate-range
Dongfeng ballistic missiles stationed in Fujian and Zhejian Provinces to achieve
victory in any attack on Taiwan.
If shifting priorities reduced the strategic impetus for aircraft carrier acquisi-
tion, the retirement in 1997 of Admiral Liu Huaqing removed the idea’s main
champion. At the same time, proponents of a “revolution in military affairs”
(RMA) were gaining influence within the Chinese armed forces. They argue that
aircraft carrier battle groups are becoming obsolete.40 Because of their high ra-
dar and electromagnetic visibility, proponents hold, carriers have become easy
targets for precision-guided missiles. Further, in their view, aircraft carriers are
vulnerable to submarines and mines. Third, the frequent need to resupply carri-
ers at sea makes them vulnerable to the destruction of logistical vessels. For all
these reasons, the RMA school believes that in modern warfare aircraft carriers
have become “floating coffins.”41
In any case, the RMA advocates believe, it is not in China’s interests to develop
a costly symmetrical fleet. Instead, China should exploit technological advances
and adopt asymmetrical strategies to defeat the larger and more powerful U.S.
Navy in a cross-strait conflict. Specifically, they argue, its carrier battle groups
can be defeated by disabling command and information systems and severing
access to supply, and by attack with such sophisticated weapons as shore-based
precision-guided missiles, stealthy surface vessels, and advanced submarines.42
In fact, the PLAN’s acquisition of Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny-class
destroyers from Russia is part of just such asymmetrical warfare strategy.43
TECHNICAL, FINANCIAL, AND GEOPOLITICAL HURDLES
The lack of urgent strategic need is not the only factor that has put the acquisi-
tion of a Chinese aircraft carrier on hold. Even if the central government decided
that the project was a strategic necessity, Chinese engineers would face formida-
ble problems in transforming their ambitions into reality. In addition, the astro-
nomical cost militates against the project for the time being. Moreover, the
Chinese leadership would also have to weigh the geopolitical consequences very
carefully.
Building an indigenous carrier or upgrading a secondhand vessel would
present a raft of technical and engineering problems. Although China has a
competent shipbuilding industry with much experience in constructing large,
oceangoing vessels, aircraft carriers require special technologies to which it has
had little exposure. These include steam catapults, arresting wires, and large ele-
vators. In addition, a carrier would also require highly advanced electronic war-
fare and radar systems—an area in which China has a patchy record and has
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relied, in the main, on foreign technology. As suggested earlier, the extent to
which Chinese engineers can make up for these deficiencies by examining ex-
Soviet carriers is doubtful.
Transforming the Minsk, Kiev, or Varyag into operational vessels would be
highly problematical. The Minsk and Kiev have both been stripped of their pro-
pulsion machinery, armament, and communications. Replacing these key ele-
ments would be difficult and costly. In addition, the vessels had been laid up for
over five years, resulting in significant deterioration by the time they arrived in
China (the incomplete Varyag is in even worse condition than the Minsk or Kiev).
Moreover, China possesses no VSTOL aircraft that could operate from the
carriers as they are now configured. The Russian navy was always disappointed
with the performance of its Yak-38s, and in any case these aircraft are no longer
in production. It is highly unlikely
that Britain, the United States, or
Spain would sell secondhand
Harrier “jump jets” to Beijing.
The Western arms embargo
placed on China following the 4 June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre is still in
force; in any case, these countries would not want to help equip the PLAN for
possible action in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea. India, which also pos-
sesses Harriers, views China as a long-term rival.
China could use these vessels as helicopter carriers. Another option, however,
would be to modify the Minsk or Kiev to accommodate conventional or
short-takeoff fixed-wing aircraft. This is what India plans to do with the last of
the Kiev-class carriers, Admiral Gorshkov. In December 1998 India and Russia
agreed in principle on the transfer of the Admiral Gorshkov;44 the ship is to be
provided free, if India has the extensive refit and refurbishment work done in a
Russian shipyard. The weapons forward will be removed to make way for a “ski
jump.” The flight-deck elevators will be enlarged and arresting gear fitted. This
conversion will configure the carrier for short takeoff but arrested recovery
(STOBAR).
The Indian project, however, will cost an estimated two billion dollars—
$750–800 million for the refit and a further $1.2 billion for an air wing of fifty
MiG-29Ks and a number of Ka-28 and Ka-31 early-warning helicopters.45 For
China, this figure is prohibitive. Construction of a carrier or conversion of a sec-
ondhand vessel in a domestic yard would also be extremely costly, especially
since much of the technology would have to be purchased abroad, quite aside
from the new fighters, helicopters, early-warning aircraft, escort surface vessels,
and screening submarines required. Moreover, one carrier would not be suffi-
cient; full operational capability would require, nominally, three whole carrier
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groups—one deployed, one in refit, and one working up. Strategically located
naval bases capable of berthing the carriers would also have to be constructed,
adding to the already burdensome bill.
Presumably the technical and engineering difficulties could be resolved over
time, with the assistance of foreign companies. There is no reason to believe that
Moscow would not assist China in the construction of an aircraft carrier, as it
has done with India. Also, the money could be found if the Chinese government
deemed it a strategic necessity; the Chinese economy continues to register im-
pressive growth. After all, the Chinese were able to overcome both technical and
financial problems in the mid-1960s, the height of the chaotic Cultural Revolu-
tion, to develop nuclear weapons; the country’s scientific, industrial, and eco-
nomic bases have been strengthened considerably since then.
The geopolitical consequences, however, are a different matter. The Chinese
government could argue that aircraft carriers are defensive, but other countries
in East Asia would view the matter very differently. A Chinese aircraft carrier
battle group would be seen as a formidable power-projection tool. It would rein-
force fears that Beijing intended to resolve its territorial disputes (especially in
the South China Sea) by force and to become the dominant regional power. The
members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), particularly
those with competing territorial claims to the Spratly Islands, would undoubt-
edly strengthen their military links with the United States, ensuring a continued
U.S. naval presence in the region. Japan would almost certainly initiate its own
aircraft carrier program.
China has been interested in the concept of aircraft carriers since the early 1980s,
when Admiral Liu Huaqing advocated the acquisition of such vessels as part of
his blue-water navy aspirations. With the retirement of Liu in 1997, however, the
aircraft carrier lost its champion in the Chinese navy. At the same time, the need
to control the South China Sea as a strategic priority was downgraded as reunifi-
cation with Taiwan hurtled to the top of Beijing’s agenda. In that context, given
the relative closeness of Taiwan and improvements in the capabilities of the Chi-
nese air force and missile arsenal, aircraft carriers are not now considered vital.
Moreover, the costs associated with building and operating aircraft carriers, the
technical difficulties involved, and the likely adverse reaction of neighboring
countries all argue against a Chinese carrier battle group for the moment.
However, the PLAN has not abandoned the idea altogether—merely shelved
it. The Chinese navy is determined to fulfill its blue-water ambitions, even if it
takes a generation or more. Moreover, public support for the acquisition of an
aircraft carrier seems high. Following the accidental bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade by NATO warplanes on 8 May 1999, a campaign was
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initiated on Chinese Internet sites to raise funds to build a carrier. Provincial
newspapers across the country took up the cause; within a month eleven million
yuan had been collected.46 Aircraft carriers are perceived as potent symbols of
national power around the world, and China is no different. The memory of the
“Century of Humiliation” (1842–1949), when European countries, Russia, and
Japan forced a weakened China to grant territorial concessions and then divided
the country into competing spheres of influence, still has a deep resonance
among the Chinese people. The Chinese see a powerful navy, capable of project-
ing power into the world’s oceans, as an important tool to prevent China from
being “bullied” again by outside powers.
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